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[L. A. No. 26484.

In Bank.

Dee. 4, 1961.]

JAMES ROBERT WITT et a1., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v.
RAYMOND LESTEH JACKSON, Defendant and Respondent; CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Intervener and
Appellant.
[1] Trial-Instructions--Requests-Necessity.-It was incumbent
on plaintiffs who requested the instruction of which they COIllplain to offer any desired modification.
[2] Automobiles-Instl"Uctions-Violation of Regulations-Justiftcation.-In an action for personal injuries sustained by two
policemen when their patrol ear was struck from the rear by
defendant's automobile while th~y were engaged in stopping
another automobile for investigation, where there was nothing
in the record to suggest a justification or excuse for plaintiff
driver's violation of either Veh. Code, § 544, subd. (c) (now
§ 22109), requiring an appropriate signal before stopping or
suddenly decreasing speed, or § 526, subd. (a) (now § 21658),
relatulg to drh'ing in laned roadways, except that he was a
Jaw enforcem<'nt officer investigating a driver Sluspected of
intoxication, whether this circumstance justified violating
statutory standards of conduct was presented to the jury in an
instruction on Yeh. Code, § 454 (now §§ 21055, 21056), granting exemptions to authorized emergency vehicles under certain
eonditions.
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Autolllobiles, §§ ISS, 413; Am.Jur., Automobiles and Highway Traffi!', § 213 et St'q.
McK. Dig. References: (1) Trial, § 136; [2, 3) Autolllobile~,
§ 319; [4] Aut()llIobiJt!~. ~ 3~;): [.1, 6] Alltolllllhile", § 110; [7) Negligence, § 247; [8) Alltolllobile~, § 30601; [9, 10] Evidence, § 165;
[11) Evidence, § 326.5; [12. 13] Automobiles, § 350-1; [14] Appeal
and Error, § 1095; (15) Contribution, § 8; [16-18] Workmen'os
Compensation, § 36.5.
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[8] Id.-Instructions-Violation of Regulations.-In an action for
personal injuries sustained by two policemen when their patrol
car was strucl( from the rear hy defcnd:lllt's automobile while
they were engaged in storrill'~ :lllotlH'r automobile for investigation, it was proper to give an instruction on Veh. Code,
§ 526 (now § 21658), rel:.iting to driving in lanC'd roadways,
where there wos conflicting testimony os to whether plaintiff
driver changed lanes, defendant having testified that plnintiff
did so when the cars were only about 100 feet or six car lengths
apart, whereas plaintiff testified thot he first saw defendant's
headlights in his rcar-yiew mirror about three or four seconds
before the impact, since the jury could infer that plaintiff had
changed lane:; and moved into the path of defendant's car
without determining w11ether he could do so with safety.
[4] Id.-Instructions-Signals.-In an action for personal injUl'ies
sustained by two policemen when their patrol car was struck
from the rear by defendant's automobile while they were engaged in stopping another automobile for investigation, there
was substantial evidence to justify an instruction on Veh.
Code, § 544 (now § 22109), requiring an appropriate signal
before a sudden decrease in speed, where plaintiff driver testified that after he had drawn alongside the other automobile
he "started to decelerate so that I could pull behind the car
that we were pulling over," the driver of the other car testified
that after he saw the flash of plaintiff rider's flashlight he
drove off the ronuway and stoppcd, and defendnnt testified
that after the police car moved into his lane its brake lights
went on, that when lll~ was approxillllltely 50 to 75 feet behind
it its red roof lights went on, and thllt he then IIttempted to
stop. It was for the jury to determine in the light of this
evidence whether the brake lights and roof lights constituted
an "approprillte sign Ill" within the meaning of the code section.
[5a t 5b] Id.-Emergency Vchicles-"Due Regard" Clause.-In lin
aetion for personal injuries sustaincd by two policemen when
their patrol cal' was struck frolll the re011' by uefendnnt's automobile while they were ellgoged in stoppill~! another automobile
for investigation, wherein the court instructcd the jury thllt
the police car WIlS an llutho1'izC'd eJllCJ'geney y('hide, the question whether plnintiff driver showed "due regard for the safety
of all persons using the highway," as required by Veh. Code,
§ 454 (now §§ 21055, 21056), was properly submitted to th"
jury in view of conflicting evidence as to whether he turned
on the red roof lights ~()on enough to warn defendllnt to stop
his vehicle or yipld the right of WilY.
[6] Id.-Emergency Vehicles-"Due Regard" Clause.-The "due
regard" c:ause of Veh. Code, § 454 (now §§ 21055, 21056) re- i
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d., Automobiles, §§ 132, 157, 192.
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quires the operator of an emergency vchicle to give a suitable
warning to afford other users of public highways an opportunity to yicld the right of way. He does not meet this requirement if he does not give the required warning until a co1lision
is inevitable.
[7] Negligence-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions.-An instruction in an lIutomobile collision case that plaintiffs had
the burden of proving that defendant's negligence was "the"
proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries (instead of "a" proximate cause) was not prejudicial, in the light of an instruction
that the acts or omissions of two or more persons may concur
in causing an injury and that each such act or omission is
regarded liS It proximate cause.
[8] Automobiles - Instructions - Disposition of Requests.-In n
rear-end collision ease involving a police car engaged in stopping a third car for investigation, it was not error to refuse
to instruct that when a person's employment requires him to
take risks that a reasonahly prudent person could avoid the
necessities of such a situation lessen the amount of calltioll
required of him by law in the exercise of ordinary care,
where there was no evidence that the taking of such risks
was requircd, and the court gave other pertinent instructions
such as that negligence is relative and not ahsolute.
[9] Evidence-Admissibility of Whole Where Part Is Proved.The rule that where part of a conversation has been shown in
testimony the remainder may be brought out by the opposing
party (Code Civ. Proc., § 1854) is necessarily subject to the
qualification that the court may exclude tho~e portions of the
conversation not relevant to the items introduced.
[10] Id.-Admissibility of Whole Where Part Is Proved.-In an
action for personal injurics sustained by two policelllen when
their patrol car was struck from the rear by defendant's automobile while they were engaged in stopping another automobile
for investigation, the admission of that portion of a statement
by plaintiff driver to an investigating officer that he did not
turn on the roof lights until after he had driven the police
car alongside the other llutomolJile did not require admission
of the remainder of the stntement that plaintiff driver then
looked in his renr view mirror and saw II vehicle coming
toward him at approximately 65 miles per hour, since the
excluded part did not tend to explain the inconsistencies between the part that was admitted and plaintiff's testimony,
and although the excluded part might indirectly suggest thllt
defendant may have had enough time to avoid the accident
after the roof lights were turned on, the eXlict time sequence
[9] See Cal.Jul'.2d, Evidcllce,

~

129; Am.Jur., Evidence, § 275.
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of events in the fcw IIWllleut::; l'rl'I·('olill~ till' Iwcidcnt WIIS Ih,!
subject of abundnnt testimony.
[11) Id. - Documentary Evidence - Hospital Records. - The trilll
court in an autolllobile collision cnse did not cOllllllit prejudidal
enol' in ruling that defendunt'l< hO~l'ital record could lIut he
ll(lmitted in evideilce unles!:' the part of the record thnt Tt'fel'red to his eondition as "HED 2-plu;;" "\'I'IIS d('lete,L Without nn ncc(llllpall~'ing explanation, thi!' cryptie, ll'ehmeal reference could !'crvc only to ('oufu;:c and lIIislead the jury,
[12] Automobiles-Instructions-Contribut.ory Negligence-Riders.
-In an action for p('rt:;onlll injurie~ sustlliued b~' two policemen whcn their patrol cllr was strucl, from the real' by defendant's automobile while thcy were cngllgcd in stopping another automobile for illvN;tigntiou, plaiutiff rider (other thau
the driver) correctly eOlltended that he W:lS prejudiced becllllse
thc instructions relating to contributory negligence were submitted to the jury without an expl:llllltion that the issue of
eontributory negligence did not have any bearing on his cause
of IIction, wherc defl'ndant (lid not plead such plnintilf's contributory negligcnce and concede<1 tha t imputed neglig'enl:t'
was not in issue, and there was no evidence that such plaintifi
was contributively negligent,
[18] Id. - Instructions - Contributory Negligence-Passengers.--When a passenger and driver bring an action against a third
party, it is prejudicial error to give an instruction on the
passenger's contributory negligence if that defense is not supported by substantial evidence and if there is sub"t:mtial evidence that the drivel' and defendant were ne('di;,;ent.
[14] Appeal-Invited Error-Instructions.-In an action for personal injuries sustained by twu polil:emen when their patrol
car was struck frolll the renr by defendant's nutolllobile while
they were engnged ill stopping another autolllobile for iuy('!'tigation, plaintifft:;' }'equest fOl' instl'ul'tiollS that "the instru('tions given you npply to each plaintiff unless otherwise stated,"
and that if the .iury !<hould find that a plninWr is entitled to
recover it must asse!'!; the damage of ellch separately /lIld
return a verdict in n sepal'llte amount for elll'h, did not invite
the erroneous instructioll reque,;tecl by defendant. submitting
the issue of plaintiil' l'id('l"S (as distinguished from ]llaintitr
driver's) contributory lH'l!'ligl'lH'e to th(' jury.
[15] Contribution-Joint Tortfeasors.-Since enactment of Code
Civ, Proc., §§ 875-880 in 1957 abrogntt'cl the rule of lloncontrihution among joint tortf'eal;on; thnt 11l'cviously existed, in
the absence of the 'Worknll'n's COmp<'llRntion At't a ncgligent.
third party would be allowed ('ontributioll a;r:1in!'<t a eonl'urrently negligent employer if t,]1(' I'llnditiollS of th(' 1'011(' s('('tions
were met.
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[16] Workmen's Compensation-Actions Against Third PersonsRight to Contribution or Rcimbursement.- A third party is
entitled to have a judgment against him reduced by the amount
of compensation paid to an injured employee if he can prove
that the concnrrent negligence of the employer contributed
to the injurips suffered by the employee. It is contrary to the
policy of the law for the employer or his subrogee, the insurance carrier, tn profit by the wrong- of the employer.
[17] Id.-Actions Against Third Persons-Right to Oontribution
or Reimbursement.-·Whether an aetion is brought by liD employer or an injured employee, a third party tortf"1I8or should
be able to invoke the concurrent negligence of the employer
to defeat itl" right to reimbursement, since in either event the
action is brought for the benefit of the employer to the extent
that compensation benefits have been paid the employee.
rI8] Id.-Actions Against Third Persons-Right to Contribution
or Reimbursement.-Whell a person is entitled to indemnity
against a negligent employer, the employer cannot recover
reimbursement fol' compensatio\l payments made to an injured
employee either by asserting a lien against a judgment recovered by the employee or by bringing an action directly
against the third party. A negligent elilployer should be in
no better position when the third party tortfeasor does not
seek indemnity; to allow the employer reimbursement in
either ease would allow him to profit hy 11is own wrong. Since,
however, the injured employee may not be allowed double
recovery, his damages must be reduced by the amount of workmen's compensation he received.

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. William B. Neeley, Judge. Affirmed ill
part and reversed in part.
Action for damages for personal injuries arising out of a
rear-end collision of automobiles. Judgment for defendant
affirmed as to plaintiff driYer and intervener employer and
reversed as to plaintiff rider.
Murray Jackson for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Roger Arnebergh, City Attorney, Bourke Jones, Assistant
City Attorney, Edwin F. Shinn and Sanford M. Gage, Deputy
City Attorneys, jor Intervrner and Appellant.
Spray, Gould & Bowers and Jean Wunderlieh for Drfp)Hlant and Respondent.
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TRAYNOR, J.-This action was brougbt by James Witt
and Julius Grossman to recover damages for personal injuries
sustained when the automobile ill wllich they wcre riding was
struck from the rear by one owned and operated hy defelldant
Jackson. The City of Los Angeles, plaintiffs' employer and
owner of the vehicle that was being driven by "'itt at the time
of the accident, intervened to recover for the damag-e to its
automobile and for workmen's compensation benefits and medical expenses paid to plaintiffs. Judgment was entered on
jury verdicts for defendant and against both plaintiffs and
the city. Plaintiffs and intervener appeW.
The accident occurred in a posted 45 mile per hour speed
lOne on Sepulveda Boulevard in Los Angeles at approximately
2 :30 a. m. on March 3, 1958. Sepulveda Boulevard is a straight
north and south four-lanc highway with a double white line
in the center. The impact occurred in the northbound lane
adjacent to the double white line. Both plaintiffs were in
uniform and were on duty as police officers. They were in a
marked, black and white police ear with two red lights on
the roof, which shone toward front and rear when turned 011.
According to plaintiffs' version of the accident, they were
traveling north on Sepulveda Boulevard in the Jane next to
the double white line when the~" saw a 1957 Dodge traveling
ahead of them at approximately 20 to 25 milE's per hour in th('
right lane for northbound traffic. Because it was moving so
slowly when traffic conditions were light, plaintiffs suspected
that the driver was under the influence of alcohol. ,Yitt pulled
the police car alongside tIle Dodge, and in accordance with
normal police procedures, Grossman flashed his flashlight at
thc driver of the Dodge to attract his attention. As the Dodge
was moving off the roadway and stopping, 'Witt slowed down
to get behind it, looked in the rear-view mirror and observed
headlights moving rapidly toward him, and heard brakes or
tires screeching. Thc police car was struck from the rear by
defendant's car. Witt testified on direct examination that he
turned on the red roof lights" just prior" to pulling alongside
the Dodge and estimated that the impact occurred 5 to 10
seconds thereafter. He testified on cross-examination that he
turned them on when he was approximately 50 feet bchind
the Dodge. He had stated in a prior admission that hE' turned
them on after he had pulled alongside the Dodge.
Defe'ndant testified that he was a California highway patrolman, returning home from all eyening at his brot}H'r's home.
Although he was in uniform, he was not on duty. lIe admitted
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drinking two glasses of beer at lunch during the preceding
afternoon and about a quart of beer at his brother's home,
which was located approximately 5 miles from the scene of
the accident. .AB he was traveling north on Sepulveda Boulevard in the lane next to the double white line at approximately
35 miles per hour, he first observed the taillights of what
proved to be plaintiffs' car in the right haud lane. He observed it change to the lane in which he was traveling when
he was approximately 100 feet behind it. He applied his
brakes as soon as the red roof lights of the police car went on.
Re estimated that he was then 50 to 75 feet behind it.
Plaintiffs challenge the instructions relating to the contributory negligence of plaintiff Witt. In addition to giving
the standard instruction on the subject of contributory negligence, the trial eourt, at defcndant's request, instructed the
jury in the language of Vehicle Code sections 544, subdivision
(c) (now § 22109) and 526, subdivision (a) (now § 21658) .
•• No person shall stop or suddenly decrease the speed of a
vehicle on a highway without first giving an appropriate signal
in the manner provided in this chapter. to the driver of any
vehicle immediately to the rear when there is opportunity to
give such signal." (§ 544, subd. (c).) .. A vehicle shall be
driven as nearly as practical entirely within a single lane and
shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has 1irst
ascertained that such movement can be made with safety."
(§ 526, subd. (a).) Immediately following the giving of these
instructions, at plaintiffs' request the court instructed the
jury that conduct in violation of a section of the Vehicle Code
is negligence as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs object to the latter instruction because it was not
qualified by a statement that a violation of a statutory standard
creates only a presumption of negligence that may be rebutted
by evidence of justific.ation or excuse. (See Alarid V. Vanier, 50
Ca1.2d 617, 621 [327 P .2d 897].) [ 1] Plaintiffs, JlOwever, requested the instruction of which they complain and it was
incumbent upon them to offer any desired modification.
(Ornales V. Wigger, 35 Cal.2d 474,479 [218 P.2d 531) ; Townsendv. Butterfield, 168 Cal. 564, 569 [143 P. 760).) [2] Moreover, there is nothing in the record to suggest a justification or
excuse for Witt's violation of either Vehicle Code provision
except that he was a law enforcement officer investigating a
driver suspected of intoxication. Whether this circumstance
justified violating statutory standards of conduct was presented to the jury in all instruction on Vehicle Code section
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454, which grants exemptions to authorized emergency vehicles
under certain conditions.
Plaintiffs contend that the court should not have given a
general instruction on contributory negligence or the instructions on Vehicle Code sections 544 and 526, on the ground that
there is no substantial evidence of contributory negligence.
[3] There is conflicting evidence as to whether Witt
changed lanes. Defendant testified that Witt did so when the
cars were only about 100 fect or six car lengths apart. Witt
testified that he first saw defendant's headlights in his rearview mirror about three or four seconds before the impact. The
jury could therefore infer that Witt had changed lanes and
moved into the path of defendant's car without determining
whether he could do so with safety.
[ 4] There is also substantial evidence to justify the instruction on section 544, which requires an appropriate signal before a sudden decrease in speed. Witt testified that after he had
drawn alongside the Dodge he "started to decelerate so that
I could pull behind the car that we were pulling over." The
operator of the Dodge testified that after he saw the flash of
Grossman's flashlight he drove off the roadway to the right
and stopped. It could be inferred that Witt decelerated rapidly to get behind the Dodge. Defendant testified that after
the police car moved into his lane its brake lights went on,
that when he was approximately 50 to 75 feet behind it its
red roof lights went on, and that he then attempted to stop.
It was for the jury to determine in the light of this evidence
whether the brake lights and roof lights constituted all "appropriate signal" within the meaning of section 544, subdivision (c).
At plaintiffs' request the trial court gave an instruction
on Vehicle Code section 454 (now §§ 21055, 21056), which
exempts drivers of authorized emergency vehicles from observing specified provisions of the Vehicle Code (including §§ 544
subd., (c) and 526, subd. (a» under certain conditions.l
·Section 454 provides that the "exemptions shall apply whenever any
said vehicle is being driven in response to an emergeney call . . . or
when used in the immediate pursuit of an actual or suspeeted violator
of the law"; that they" shall apply only when the driver of said vehicle
sounds a siren as may be reasonably necessary and the vehiele displays
R lighted red lamp visible from th(' front as a warning to others"; but
that they "shall not relieve the driver of any said vehicle from the dut.y
10 drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway,
nor shall the provisions of this section protect any sueh drivl'r from tIl('
C!onsC!quenees of an arbitrary exercise of the privileges declared in this
Bection. "
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Plaintiffs maintain t.hat all of the conditions set forth in
this section were met and t]mt the trial court was therefore
precluded as a matter of law from submitting the defense of
eontributory neg1igence to the jury.
[ 5a] The court instructed thc jury tl1ftt the police l'ar was
all authorizcd emCl'llency ,"chide>. AltJlOUgh it m[l~' be assumcd
that the other conditions of section 454 were met, the jury
still had to determine whether Witt operated the vehicle "with
due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway."
[6] T]le" due regard" clause of section 454 requires tIle
operator of an emergency ,'ehic]e to give a suitahle Wal'llillg to
afford other users of public llighways an opportunity to yield
the right of way. (Lucas v. C·ity of Los Angeles, 10 Cal.2d
476, 483 [75 P.2d 599) ; Raynor v. City of Arcata, 11 Cal.2d
113, 117 [77 P.2d 1054] ; Reed v. Simpson, 32 Ca1.2d 444, 450
[196 P.2d 895].) An opC'rator of an emergency vehicle does
1I0t meet the l'equiremt'llts of the "due regard" clause if he
docs not give the required warning until a collision is inevitable. [5b] In view of the conflicting evidence a.s to whether
Witt turned on the roof 1ight soon enough to warn defendant
to stop his vehicle or yield the right of way, the question
whether Witt showed" due regard for the safety of all persons
using the highway" was properly submitted to the jury. (See
West v. Cily of San Diego, 54 Ca1.2d 469 [6 Cal.Rptr. 289, 353
P.2d 929] ; Reed v. City of Sa11 Diego, 77 Cal.App.2d 860, 867868 [177 P.2d 21].)
[7] Plaintiffs complain of an instruetioll thnt plaintiffs lUld
1he burden of proving that t]w IH'gligenct' of d('fend~!J1t wac; tll(',
proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. The use of the definite
instead of the indefinite article was not prejudicial in the
light of the instruction that the aets and omission!'; of two or
more persons may concur in causing an injury and tllat each
such act or omission is regarded as a proximate cause. (Squier
v. Davis Standard Bread Co., 181 Cal. 533, 537 [185 P. 391) ;
Hellman v. Los Angdes Ry. Corp., 135 Cal.App. 627, 645 [27
P.2d 946, 28 P.2d 384]; Dieterle v. Yellow Cab Co., 53 Cal.App.
2d 691,694-696 [128 P.2d 132] ; MatslImoto v. Re1l1ler, 90 Cal.
.App.2d 406,410 [202 P.2c11051].)
[8] , The trial court refused to give the following instruction requested by plaintiffs: "When a person's lawful cmplo:rmCllt requirelS that he work in a dangcrous location or a place
that involves unusual possibilities of injury, or rt'quires that in
th(' line of his duty, he take risk" which ordinarily a reasonably
prudent person could avoio, tIl(' necessities of such a situation,
I"C~
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insofar as they limit the caution that he ean take for his own
safety, lessen the amount of caution required of him by law
in the exercise of ordinary care." There is no evidence that
investigating the <1river of the Dodge required the taking of
risks that ordinarily a reasonably prudent person could avoid.
Moreover, the court instructed the jury that negligence is
relative and not absolute, that allegedly negligent conduct
must be consi<1ered in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, and that the amount of caution required for ordinary
care depends upon the danger that is or should be apparent
to the actor in the particular situation. (Cf. Fry v. Sheedy,
143 Ca1.App.2d 615, 627 [300 P.2d 242].)
During cross-examination of an investigating officer, defendant '8 counsel read the following statement given by Witt
and contained in the witness's accident report: "I observed
a slow-moving vehicle northbound on Sepulveda. I followed
this vehicle and observed it being driven straight but slow. I
pulled up alongside this vehicle and looked at tIle driver and
decided to interrogate him. At this time I turned on the red
lights." The witness then testified that he remembered Witt's
making this statement to him. On redirect examination plaintiff's counsel offered the remainder of Witt's statement, but defendant's objection to its admission was sustained. In this part
of the statement2 Witt stated that after turning on the roof
lights he looked in the rear-view mirror and saw a vehicle
coming toward him at approximately 65 miles per hour and
that this vehicle then collided with the squad car. Plaintiffs,
relying upon Code of Civil Procedure section 1854, contend
that the trial court's ruling was prejudicial error. [9] That
section provides in part that "w!len a detaehed act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence, any other
act, declaration, conversation, or writing, which is necessary
to make it understood, may also be given in evidence." In
People Y. Kent, 135 Cal.App.2d 422, 428 [287 P.2d 402], the
court stated: "The rule that wllere part of a conversation
has been shown in testimony the remainder of that conversation
·We quote the words in the report immeuiately following the part
read on cross-examination: "I looked in the rear-view mirror alld saw
a vehicle coming up bellind me at a 11igh rate of speed, approximately
65 m.p.h. I thought this vehiclemigllt not be able to stop as it was in
the same ~raffic lane (N-l) as I was, and as I was only going ahout
10 m.p.h., I was going to go forward and get over to the right, out of
its wny. I then realized this cnr was coming too fast and it was going
to hit my ear, so I moved to the left so our car would not hit the car
we were intending to stop. The car c,oming behind me started to skid
and then hit us."
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may be brought out by the opposing party, is necessarily subject to the qualification that the court may exclude those
portions of the conversation not relevan t to the items thereof
which have been introuuced." (See also People v. McCoy,
25 Cal.2d 177, ]87 [153 P.2U 315] ; People v. ](iser, 24 Cal.App.
340, 546 [141 P. 1078].) It is plaintiff's theory that the
excluded part of Witt's statement is relevant in that it tends
to explain when he tumed on the roof ligllts in relation to the
moment of the impact.
[10] 'rIw part of 'Yitt's statemeut that was read by defendant's counsel is an at1mi:ssioll that "'itt did not tllJ'n 011 1li(' roof
lights until after he had driven the police car alongside the
Dodge. The excluded part ill no way tended to explain the
inconsistem:ies behwen this admission and 'Witt's testimony.
(See People v. Alv(;rf, 182 Cal.App.2d 729, 741 [6 Cal.Rptr.
473].) Although the excluned part may innirectly suggest
that defendant may haye llad enough time to avoid the
accident after the roof lights were tumed on, the c:mct time
sequence of e\'ents in the few moments preceding the accident
was the subject of abunnant testimony. (See Long v. CaUfornia-Western States Vfe b,S. Co., 43 Ca1.2d 871, 881-882 [279
P.2d 43].) Thus, it cannot l)c said that the trial court abnsed
its discretion in excluding t11e part of Witt'sstatment offered
by plaintiffs. This is 1I0t a case where a party's admi,,<:ion was
contained ill a 10llger statement and wa~ se1'iou!'1.\' f]ualifierl b~'
other language in that statC'll:ent. In sneh a cas<:>, of course. the
party making the admission is seriously prejudierrl if he is not
permitted to haye the oualifying language submitted to tllp
jury along with tIle admission. (Risdon V'. Yafc.~, 145 Cal. 210,
212-214 [78 P. 641].) No;:- is this a case where counsel took
part of a statemPllt out of eontext and attempte<l to twist it
into a fatal admis~ioll. (See Rosenbe1'[] v. 'Wittenborn, 178 Cal.
App.2d 846 [3 Cal.Hptr. 459].)
[11] Plain! itr" contend that the trial court cOllllni, 1<:><1
prejudicial error ill ruling that a llOspital r<'('or<1 rontaining- a
diagnosis of d<:>fenc1ant eould I~Ot be admitte,l ill nidpllce U11less the part of tIlt' reroru that refeJTcd to his condition as
"lIBD 2-plus" \\'a5 deletC'd. ,Vithout :m arcompfl1Jyillg' explanation, this cryptic, tedllJical Tt'frrrnce conld Sf'rYe ollly to
confuse and mislea(l the jury.
[12] Plaintiff r: rossm:l1l corr('<'11y COllt ('nds that lIe V;1lS
prejudiced because thc instructions relating to contributory
negligence w~re snhmitted to the jury without an explanatioll
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that the issue of contributory ll('gligen(~c dii! J:I,< i:a,",' allY l.\l'c:ringupon his cause of action. At defpIHla:,t';: l"('ep:(':-;t, nl<' trial
court gave the following instruction: "Contriliutory )1I';.rJigl'lW(,
is negligence on the part of a person who ill( J'wj"tcr b("'OIl'I"~ a
claimant for damages for alleged injury to Ids perSOll or his
property and whieh negligence, concurring with the nel?ligence
of another, contributes in some degree in proximately causing
the damage of which the claimant thereafter complains. One
who is guilty of contributory 'lcgligence may not recover from
another for the injury suffered." (Italics added.) In another
instruction the jury was told that if "the plaiutiff" was contributively negligent and that. negligence was a proximate
cause of his injuries the verdict must be for defendant.
Defendant did not plead Grossman's contributory negligence and he concedes that imputed negligence was 110t in issue.
There is no evidence that Grossman was contributiYely il('gligent. [13] When a passenger and driver brill~ an action
against a third party it is prejudicial error to give an instruction on the passenger's contributory negligellce if that defense
is not supported by substantial evidence and if there is substantial evidence that the driver and dcfendant were negligent. (Kollert v. 01l11dijJ, 50 Ca1.2d 768, 771-772 (329 P.2d
897] ; see also Miller v. Peters, 37 Ca1.2d 89, 95 (230 P.2d
803] ; Ohristensen v. Bocian, 169 Cal.App.2d 223, 229 [336
P.2d 1018]; Dike v. Goldell State 00., 125 Cal.App.2d 6,
13-15 [269 P.2d 619].)
[14] Defendant seeks to aYoid tIlt" forcc of th08e c'as('s b;\invoking the doctrine of invited error. He corre(·tJ~· points out
that plaintiffs requested an instruction giyen by the trial COll1't
that stated in part that" the instructions given you apply to
each plaintiff unless otherwise stated." The fallacy in defendant's argument is that plaintiffs do not contend that any
error was committed in tIle giving of this instruction. It was
requested along with another instruction stating that if the
jury should :find that a plaintiff is entitled to recover it must
assess the damage of each separately and return a verdict in
a separate amount for each. Plaintiffs' request for these two
instructions in no way im-ited the erroneous instruction requested by defendant SUbmitting the issue of Grossman's
contributory negligence to tIle jury.
To the extent that the judgment agaill~t the citr is dependc'ut upon plaintiff Witt's appC'aJ it lUu"t 1)(' affirmed, for Witt's
contentions are witbout merit. In ret.urning a general verdict for defendant the jury must haye found that defend·
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allt was not negligent or that Witt was contributively negligent.
] f defendant was not nrgligcllt, he is, of ('ourse, ))Ot liable 10 tlle

eity; if he was negligent but the jury found that Witt was
('ontriuutively negligent, his negligence is imputed to his
t'll1ployer, the city, and bars its recovery for the damage to
1he automobile and the payments made to Witt for compensation and medical expenses. (Globe Indemnity Co. v. Hook,
46 Cal.App. 700 [189 P. 797] ; Prosser, Torts (2d ed. 1955)
p.299.) The city does not dispute this conclusion.
The city contends, howeyer, tl1at the negligence of Witt,
jf any. is not a defense to its cause of action to recover the
mnonnt it paid Grossman in workmen's compensation.
When an employee's injuries are compensable under tlH'
"\Yorkmen's Compensation Act, such compensation is his exdusive remedy against his employer. (Lab. Code, § 3601.)
Labor Code section 3852, llOwever, authorizes an action by an
employee against a third party whose negligence was a proximate cause of his injurics.
There are threc ways in which an employer who become;;
obligated to pay compensation to an employee may rel'oyrr the amouut so expended against a neg-Jig-pnt third party.
He may bring an action direet);I' against t11r third party (Lah.
Code, § 3852), join as a party plaintiff or intervene in an
action brought by the employee (Lab. Code, § 3853), or allow
the employee to prosecute the action himself and subsequently
apply for a first lien against t11e amount of the emplo~'('e's
,judgment, less an allowance for litigation expenses and attorney's fees (Lab. Code, § 3856, subd. (b». None of these
provisions gives any indication as to whether or not the employer's right to reimbursement is defeated when the
employee's injuries are caused by the concurring negligence
of the employer or another of his agents and a third party.
[15] In Finnegan v. RoyaJ Realty Co" 35 Ca1.2d 409, 434435 [218 P.2d 17], affirming a judgment recovered by an employee against a third party tortfeasor, this court held that
the defendant was not entitlcd to have the judgment reduced
by the amount of compensation that the plaintiff had receiyed
from his employer's insurance carrier. In so llOlding, the
court allowed the carrier to assert its lien under Labor Code
section 3856 even though the parties conceded that the employer "conducted his business in a grossly negligent manner." (35 Ca1.2d at p. 411.) The court relied upon Pacific
Indemnity Co. v. Caliform'a Electric Works, Ltd., 29 Cal.App.
2d 260, 270-271 [84 P.2d 313], where it was held that a third
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party tortfeasor could not assert the defense of the employer's
concurrent ncgligcnce when the employer's carrier asserted
its lien against the employee's jUdgment. (Sec also Milosevich
v. Pa.ci/ic Elcct1'ic Ry. 00., 68 Ca1.App. 662, 668-669 [230 P.
15].) This defense was equated with an attempt to secure contribution between joint tortfeasors. Since California then followed the common-law rule denying cont.ribution (Smith v.
Fall flit:cr JOi11i V'l1i01I IUgh School Dist., 1 Ca1.2d 331, 339
[34 P.2d 994] ; Ada111s v. White Bus JAnes, 184 Cal. 710 [195
P. 389]), the court. pointed out that if there were no Workmen's Compensation Act the defendant could not shift part of
the respol1!libi1it~· for tIle judgment rendered against it to the
employer's carrier. Accordingly, the court framed the question
before it as "whether or not the 'Vorkmen's Compensation
Act, and the payment of certain sums thereunder, operate to
rcliet·e the [defendant] . . . of a portion of its adjudicated
responsibility." (29 Ca1.App.2d at p. 266.) (Italics added.)
This IangmlJrc indicates that in adherence to the principle
underlying the rule denying contribution, the court would not
accept the defendant's defense unless it could point to an
express provision in the Workmen's Compensation Act declaring that an employer or its carrier could not assert its lien
,,,,hen the concurrent negligence of the emplo~'er contributed
to the employee's injuries. The enactment of Code of Civil
Procedure sections 875-880 in 1957, hO"'ever, abrog-atl'd the rule
of 110ncontributiol1 tllat existed when the Pacific Indemnity
and Finnegan cases were decided. Thus, toda~', in the absence
of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a negligent third party
would be allowed contribution against a C'oncurrently neglig-ent
employer if thc conditions of sectiol1"; 875-880 nr,' met. As a
result of the enactment of thrs:, f;C'('tiClIs, tll(' ]'casoninl? in the
Pacific l'l1derl11dty case, ",1Jicl! in tUI'lI was relied upon by this
court in the Finnegan case, llas h<.'en rendered ohsolete.
A majority of jurisdictions that }layC passed 011 tIle question
have held that a third party tortfC'flsor cannot assert the COllcurrent negligence of the C'mplo~'er as a drfense. whether thr
employer, the e1l1plo~-C'1' 's l'arriC'l'. or the rmplo~'C'e has lJrougllt
the action again~111im. (Cyr Y. F. S. 1)01111C Co. (D.C. COlllJ.).
112 F.Supp. 526, 532: lfil7iollls Bros. E1I1nber CO. Y. IIleisel,
85 Ga.App. 72 [68 S.E.211 384. 388] : Fir7r7ity d'- Casualty 00.
v. Oe<wr VaHey Electric Co .. 187 Iowa 1014 [J74 N.W. 709,
711] ; City of Shrcveport Y. ~r;01tfhI!'C8fcrll Ga.~ «- Electric Co.,
145 La. 680 [82 So. 78!l. 787] ; (icncral Bo:r 00. Y. lINssouri
Utilities Co., 331 Mo. 845 [3:i S:W.211442, 44:i] ; Ft1ey Y. Tay-
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luI' (f· Gas];il1, 305 Mieh. 561 [9 N.\Y.2d 842, 847-848] ; Graham
Y. Oily of Lincoln, J06 Neh. 30:) [183 N.W. 569] ; Royal Indcmnity Co. v. Sou.thern California Petroleum Corp., 67 N.M.
J37 [353 P.2d 358, 363] ; Baker v. Traders & General Ins. Co.
(10 Cir.) 199 F.2d 289 [OklallOma law] ; Clark v. Chicago,
]1. St. P. R. Co., 214 W·b. 295 [252 N'.W. 685, 689].) Most
of these cases have t:easoned that the employer should he able
10 get reimhursement from the third party tortfeasor despite
his own concurrent lleg1i~enee became tIle relevant Workmen's
Compensation Act did not expressly preclude his recovery.
Others have reasoned that the employer's rights against tlIC
third party are precisely the same as the rights of the employee; since the employee i., not barred, neither is the employer.
A few jurisdictions, howe'\'er, notably Pennsylvania and
North Carolina, lmve not allowed the negligent employer to
get reimbursement from thc third part~T tortfE"8Sor. (See also
Rylander v. CltiC(fgo Shod Line Ry. Co., 17 Ill.2d 618 [161
N.E.2d 812] ; Alaimo v. DIl POllt, 11 Ill.ApT>. 238 r136 N.E.2d
542] ; Thornton Bros. CO. Y. Recsc, 188 Minn. 5 [246 N.W.
527] ; Ba.ccl1e v. Ha,zcyoll Lincs (3 Cir.) 187 F.2d 403, reycl.
011 other grounds, Jlal('yon Lillcs Y. Haeml Ship Ceiling &
Refitting Corp., 342 U. S. 282[72 S.Ct. 277, 96 L.Ed. 318].)
When an employee recovers a judl!ment al!ainst a third party
tortfeasor, Penns;\"lnll1ia allows the third party to secure
C'ontribution from the negligent employer, limited to the
nmount of compensation pa~'ments the employer has made
to the employee. (Maio v. Falls, 339 Pa. 180 [14 A.2d 105,
110] ; Brown v. Dickey, 397 Pa. 454 [155 A.2d 836, 840].)
North Carolina, on the otller hand, holds that the third party
is entitled to have the judgment against him reduced by the
amount of compensation paid to tIle injured employee if he
can prove that the concurrent l1C'gligcllce of the employer contributed to tIle injuries sufi'C'reu b~' the employee. (Brown v.
FOlltlze"ll Ry. Co., 204 N. C. 668 [169 S.E. 419); Essick v.
City of Lexington, 233 N. C. 600 [65 S.E.2d 220,225] ; Lovette
'\'. Lloyd, 236 N.C. 663 [73 S.E.2d 886, 892].)
[16] We find the 1"casons supporting the North Cn1"olillu
rule persuasive. In the Browll {'asc, supra, it was stated that
"when tIle employ(>c or lli., el>tate has been satisfied, and the
employer seeks to re('o'\'('1" t he amount paid by him, from suell
third party, his hands ougllt not to llaw the blood of the d('a.l
or injured '\,orkman upon them, when he thus invo},es the
impartial powers and proeess('s of the law." (169 S.E. at p .
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420.) The LOt'ctie case, supm, l'eit<'l'ated tl)e same argumpnt
in more moderate lallguag<,: "It is ('ontl'aJ'Y to the policy of
the law for the elllploYl'r, or lli~; i-iIlL;'(\~('(', tll\' immrance carrier, to profit by the '\T(!Jlg of the ellll'loyer." (73 S.E.2d at
pp. 891-892.) (Sec also Star!.: v. ]'osh Construction Co., 162
Pa. Super. 409 (162 A.2d 9, ]2).) This policy sllCl111d 1)J'('Yail
here since there is 110thiug in the Labor Code to suggest that
the LC'gislature cOlltc'mpJatcd that a lll'gligent employer could
tal;:e advantage of the rcimbnrS(,Il1<'Jlt remedies that those
sections pl'oyiul'. In t 1Je aLseJj('e of ('xpre:-;'; tPl'll1S to the contrary, these pl'o\,jsiol1~' must be dC(,Il1Nl to be qualified by
Civil Code seetiol) 3;:;]7 whi('h provides that "No one can take
advantage of his own wrong." [17] Thus, whetller an aetioH
is brought hy the elllplo~'rr or the em pI oyt't', the third party
tortfeasor should 1)(' able to invoke the eOlll'lll'rcnt negligence of
the emplo;ver to defeat it s rig!lt of rei III 1>ursel11(,l1t, since, in
either ewnt, the action is brought for tIle benefit of th(' emplo~'er to the extellt that compeJ1<.;ation llt'uefits have been paid
to the emplo~·ee. (Sce LOl'cffr Y. Lloy(?, supra, 73 S.E.2d at p.
892.)
Support f01' this ru1e is found in Balluh v. ROOel's, 24 Ca1.2d
200 [148 P.2d 633, ]52 A.L.R. 1043), invoh';ng a plaintiff who
was injured by -tIle nl'gligclll'c of h(')' employer while he was
driving an automohile oWIl<,d by a third party. The court held
that the employer-employee relationship did not bar th(' employee from brillging an a('lion Hg-ninst the third party under
Vehicle Code section 402 [now ~% 17150-17];)7] (W11i{'h imputes the negligence of Ole operator of a "ehide to its owner)
and that the exclusiv(' remedy proyj;,ions of the 'Workmen's
Compemation Act (JJab. Code, §§ 3600-3G01 i lh1 not p1'(,(']1111('
the third party owner from gaillil1~ i)!<lemnity from the l'lIlployer-operator under Vehiele Code sel'tion 402.
It is true that there is no lrgal l'!'latioJl"hip ill this case
between the employer and tlJiru party ('omparahle to the bailorbailee relationship UPOIl whieh the Bangh ho~r1ing was based.
NeYl'rtheless, that ('aSl' is signifleant hel'ause the court was not
]wrsnaded by the employer's arguIlll'ut that iig holding deprived him of the lil'JI grantl'd to an emplo~'l'r by Labor Code
sl'ction 3856. "The owner will be elltitl('d to haw credited on
the judgment against him all~' amount pai<l hy the operator
(or his insurallC'c carri('r) b~' way of l'ompl'llsation for the
injuQ', and the amount to be l'eeoverrd by the bailor-owner
from the bailee-operator necessarily will be reduced pro tanto."
(24 Ca1.2d at p. 216.) It is evident from this language that
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had tlle employcr brought an action in l1is own name against
the third party under Labor Code section 3852 he would not
have becn allowed to recover compensation payments made to
the employee. [18] Thus, when a person is {'ntitled to indemnity against a negligent employer, the employer cannot tpC'ovcr
reimbursement for compensation payments made to an injured
employee eitller by asserting a lien against a judgment recovered by the employee or by bringing an action directly a,:rainst
the third party. (See San Francisco Unified Scltool Dist. v.
Oalifornia, BlIildin!J ~Iainte11(/l1Ce 00 .• 162 Cal.App.2d 434 [328
P.2d 785] ; ct. Lab. Code, § 3864.) A negligent employer should
be ill no better position when, as here, the third party tortfeasor does not seck indpmnity; to allow tIle emplo~'er Trimbursement in either case would allow him to profit from his
own wrong. Since, however, th(' injured employee may not be
allowed double recover~', llis damages 11111st be reduced by the
amount of workmen's compensation 11e received.
The judgment is affirmed as to plaintiff Witt and the city.
The judgment is reversed as to plaintiff Grossman.
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., concurred.
SCHAUER., J., Concurring and Disseuting.-I find in the
record no error shown to be prejudicial to either of the
plaintiffs or to the intervener. Accordingly I would affirm the
judgment in its entirety.
In the abscllce of a showing by plailltiff-appel1ant Grossman
that the 'verdict against him was based on a finding that he
was contrihutively negligent we should assume-indeed, on·
this record, infer-in favor of the judgment, that the "erdiet
implies a finding that defendant was not negligent.
The handling of appeals in personal injur~· actions now constitutes an oyerly large portion of the work of this court. We
should not lightly presume in favor of reyersal that an error
ill instructions has worked a miscarriage of justice within the
provisions of the Constitution, article VI, section 4%.1
There is no suggestion in the majority opinion that the
"'No judgment shall be set. aside, or Dew trilll grnntc<l, in any cnst',
on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission
or rejection.Df eyidcnec, or for nny error as to :my matter of pleading,
or for any error as to :my mnttl'r of procedure, l1nlc~R, nfter an exnmination of the entire cause, including the eyidenee, the court shall
be of the opinion that til(> error fOIll)llnined of has reRultcd in II, IDisearl'iuge of justice."

)

I

i

II

I
II
i

I

)
/

I
I

Dec. 1961]

ALLIED

COMPo INS. Co.

1'.

IND. Ace. COM.

115

[57 C.2d 115; 17 Cal.Rptr. 817. 367 P.2d fOOl

lS. F. No. 20813.

In Bank.

Dec. 22,1961.]

ALLIED COMPENSATION INSUHANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, V. INDUSTInAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION
and MARGE E. LAWLER LINTZ, Respondents.
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Bearing-Reference.-The Industrial Accident CommiRsion is required to make an independent
examination of thc record when it rejects the findings and
recommendations of its referee. (Lab. Code, § 5315.)
\
[2] Id.-Bearing-Examiners.-The requirement of a hearing by
the Industrial Accident COlllmission prior to making an award
may be satisfied though members of the commission do not
actually hear or even read all of the evidence. Evidence may
be taken by an examiner, and the evidence thus taken may
be sifted and analyzed by competent subordinates.
[3] Id.-Bearing-Reference.-The obligation of panel members
of the Industrial Accident Commission is to achieve a substantial understanding of the record in n compensation case by any
reasonable menns, including the usc of a referee's summary.
[4] Id.-Bearing-Reference.-There is no reason for distinguishing between the oral and writtcn evidence developed before a
referee in a workmen's compensation cnse; both should be
considered by the Industrial Accident Commission if relev:mt
to the issues. On the other hand, there is no reason for requiring that irrelevant parts of either the written or oral evidence
he reviewed exhaustively; the transcript is as much a part of
the record as is evidence receh'ed in written form.
[5] Id.-Reconsideration of Order or Award-Evidence.--On reeOllsiaemtion of a disability rating awnrd by the Industrial
Accident Commission, the disnbled employee's testimony was
relevant to the issues where her testimonv related almost
exclusively to the ~xtent of her disnhiIit~·, which was the sole
issue presented to a panel of the commission on reconsideration.
[6] Id. - Reconsiderati.on of Order or Award - Evidence. - The
panel mem hers of the Industrinl Accident Commission were
not oblignted to rend the entire record, including the trnns('.ript, on reconsideration of 1I disability rating award by the
commission; the written evidence together with n referee's
summary of the disnbled employee's testimony was ample to

[1] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Workmen's COlllpemntion, § 30S.
[5] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Workmen's Compenf;ntion, § 319 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1-4J Workmen's Compensation, § 151;
[5-12,14] Workmen's Compensntion, ~ 2]8; [13] Workmen's Compensation, § 165.
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provide n complete nnu full UIlUl!l"..t:lI1uiug" of the record. The
compensntion carrier's contention thllt the referee's summary
was inadequate was without merit "'here it was not suggested
in what particulars it was defective, and where it actually
emphasized the parts of the employee's testimony most favorable to the carrier.
[7] Id.-Reconsideration of Order or Award-Hearing.-Informal
use of the rating bureau's opinions by a panel of the Industrial
Accident Commission, on reconsideration of a disability rating
award by the commission, was error but was not prejudicial
to the compensation carrier where the award after reconsideration was clearly based on a second rating recommended by the
bureau upon a newly formulated disability statement and
formally noticed and served, the carrier was allowed to crossexamine the rating expert and introduce rebuttal evidence
with respect to his report, and there was nothing that the
carrier could have accomplished in a hearing on the informal
report that it was not permitted to accomplish in the hearing
held on the formal report.
[8] ld.-Reconsideration of Order or Award-Evidence.-The referee, on reconsideration of a disability rating award by the
Industrial Accident Commission, properly disallowed the introduction of further medical evidence bearing on the extent
of the employee's disability and other evidence relating to
her occupational classification at the hearing for cross-examination of the rating expert, where that hearing was in terms
limited to examination and evidence bearing on accuracy of
the rating expert's conclusion, his recommendation was based
on the disability statement prepared by a panel of the commission, and the expert had no way of knowing whether or
not the factors of disability included in that statement were
accurate.
[9] ld.-Reconsideration of Order or Award-Hearing.-The Industrial Accident Commission, on reconsideration of a disability rating award, was not bound to grant the compensation
carrier's motion for further hearing for presentation of further
medical evidence bearing on the extent of the employee's disability and other evidence relating to her occupational classification where the right to a further hearing for introduction
of rebuttal evidence is statutory (Lab. Code, § 5704), the only
matters added to the record after the initial hearing were the
secret and formal reports of the rating bureau, and the compensation carrier was given an adequate hearing with respect
to these reports.
[10] ld.-Reconsideration of Order or Award-Hearing.-BeYOlld
the statutory right to a further hearing, on reconsideration
of a disability rating awnrd by the Industrial A('cident COIllmission, the granting of continuances and further hearing'S
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rests in the sound discretion of the commission. (Cal. Admin.
Code, tit. 8, rule 10774.)
[11] ld.-Reconsideration of Order or Award-Rearing.-On reconsideration of a disability rating award by the Industrial
Accident Commission, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny
the compensation carrier's request that it be permitted to show
that the employee worked in the canning rather than in the
produce industry, thereby allegedly reducing her disability
from 77 per cent (which was recommended by the rating
bureau) to 64 per cent and relieve the carrier of its present
liability for a life pension, where at the initial hearing it
was agreed that the occupational category should be "Celery
trimmer-produce, by hand."
[12] ld.-Reconsideration of Order or Award-Rearing.-On reconsideration of a disability rating award by the Industrial
Accident Commission, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny
the compensation carrier's request for a hearing to introduce
the report of an independent medical examiner where there
was no claim that therc was not a complete and full opportunity to introduce all relevant medical evidence at the original hearing.
[13] ld.-Evidence.-The Industrial Accident Commission has the
power to resoh'e conflicts in the evidence.
[14] ld.-Reconsideration of Order or Award-Evidence.-A statement of an employce's disability formulated by a panel of the
Industrial Accident Commission that provided the basis for
the commission's disability rating award after reconsideration
was supported entirely by one physician'S report that was submitted at the Ol"iginal hearing, though this report was inconsistent both with thc oth<'1' medical opinions in the record and
with the referec's observations of the employee described in
his report.

PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Accident Commission awarding compensation for personal injuries, after reconsideration of a disability rating award.
A ward affirmed.
Mnllen & Filippi and John W. Moore for Petitioner.
Everett A. Corten, Emily B. Johnson, Rupert A. Pedrin,
Magee, Ott & HaY"'ood and Sidney H. Haywood for R€!'pondents.
TRA YNOR, J.-l\Targe E. Lawler Lintz sustained a back
injury ill the course' of her employment as a celery trimmer.
Allied Compe'nsatioll 1n!'u1'al1(,(, Company, hereinafter re-
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ferred to as Allied, the compensation carrier, voluntarily furnished medical care and tcmporary compensation. After sub!;tantial treatment an operation v;as performed. Although Mrs.
Lintz's condition showed improvement, some disability rcmained.
Upon her application for compensation she was examined
orally before a commission referee. Medical reports were also
introduced. From this evidence the referee formulated a
statement of disability. The commission's Permanent Disability Rating Bureau rated the disability as stated at 32¥2
per cent. The referee summarized tile oral evidence and then
adopted the 32~ per cent figure in his findings and award of
April 22, 1960.
Mrs. Lintz's petition for reconsideration ,vas granted to
secure the opinion of an independent medical examiner as to
the extent of her disability "if the parties so agree." Mrs.
Lintz agreed to the examination on condition that it involve
no cost to her. Allied offered to pay only half the cost, although it also offered to abide by the practice of the commission in similar cases. Panel One of the commission apparently
concluded that the parties had failed to agree as to who should
bear the costs of the examination and proceeded to redetermine Mrs. Lintz's disability on the basis of the medical
reports introduced at tbe first hearing, tbe referee's report,
and his summary of Mrs. Lintz's testimony. Inasmuch as no
transcript of her testimollY ,vas requested by the parties or
ordered by the commission, no member of the deciding pan('l
was familiar with it except as it was summarized by the referee and referred to in the briefs of the parties.
Panel One informally secured from the rati1lg bureau information as to what ratings would be recommended if various
factors of disability were in('Iuded in the disability statement.
The parties were not notified of tbis inquiry or of the bureau's
answer. The panel then formulated a ne,v disability statement and submitted it to the bureau formally. The recommended rating was 77 per cent. Allied was granted a hearing
for cross-examination of the rating expert and presentation
of evidence in rebuttal to his report. The exp('rt t('stified tbat
the difference between the first and second ratillgs was caused
solely by the inclusion in the seeond statement of Mrs. Lintz's
limitation "to sedentary occupations.... " Oue of the medical
reports stateq that she "could probably do some SeOf'lltary
work, but anything requiring prolonged standing, lifting or
bending would not be feasible for an indefinite time." The
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other medical reports inclieatecl tllat her injury was less severe
and that she was not so narrowly limitecl occupationally. The
referee concluded that" applicant's demeanor on the stand"
was consistent with these latter reports. Allied's efforts at
this llearing to introduce additional evidence relating to her
disability and occupational classification were unsuccessful.
A motion for a further hearing at which this evidence might
be introduced was denied. The commission adopted the 77
per cent figure in its award after reconsideration.
Allied seeks annulment of the commission's award. Its principal contention is that it was deni<>d a fair hearing beC'ause
the second disability statement was formulated without reference to the entire record. [1] It is clear that. the commission is required to make an independent examination of the
recorcl when, as here, it rejects the findings and recommendations of its referee. (Lab. Code, § 5315 j .lfaiional Auto «; Oas.
Ins. 00. V. Industrial Acc. Oorn., 34 Ca1.2d 20, 30 r206 P.2d
841] ; Pacific I?ldem. 00. V. Industriol Acc. Oom., 28 Cal.2d
329, 339 [170 P.2d 18] ; Oal1'fonlia Shipbuildin[J Oorp. Y. Indust"ial Acc. Com., 27 Ca1.2d 536, 544 [165 P.2cl 669] ; Helmick V. Indusfl"ial Acc. Oom., 46 Cal.App.2cl 651, 656 [116
P.2d 658] ; Taylor v. Industrial Ace. Oom., 38 Cal.App.2d 75,
82 [100 P.2d 511] j sce also GOY. Code, § 1]517, suhd. (a);
000PC1' V. State BOQl'd of Medical Examiners, 35 Ca1.2d 242,
246 [217 P.2d 630, 18 A.L.n.2d 593] ; Boh"citrr Y. Gal'1'ison,
81 Ca1.App.2d 384, 399 [J 84 P .2d 323].) The extent of that
independent examination has not, howe'ver, been clearly cletlnecl. In the first Morgan case the United States Suprcme
Court held generally that "The one who decides must hear."
(Morgan V. U,tlited Statc.~, 298 U. S. 468, 481 [56 S.Ct. 906,
80 L.Ed. 1288].) [2 J The re(luirement of a hf>aring may
be satisfied, ho,vever, even though the members of the commission do not actually lwar (Ooope!' v. State Board of M ed-iral
Examiners, supra, p. 246; Morgan V. Un-ifed States, supra, pp.
480-482; McGraw Electric 00. V. United States (E.D. Mo.),
120 F.Supp. 354, 358, affd. 348 U. S. 804 [75 S.Ct. 45, 99'
L.Ed. 635]), or even read, all of the evidence. (Lmllbermen's
M1tt. Ca.s. 00. V. Industrial Acc. 00111., 29 Ca1.2d 492, 50] [175
P.2d 823] ; M01'gcr1! V. United States, supra, pp. 480-482; 7'aub
v. Pirnie, 3 ,N.Y. 188 [144 N.E.2cl 3, 5] ; Wiscon.sin V. Ind1lstrial Oom., 272 Wis. 409 [76 N.W.2d 362, 369-370] ; Sf>e Rl~o
United States Y. Morgan, 313 F. S. 409, 420 r61 S.Ct. 999, 85
L.Ed. 1429].) "EvidC'llce may be taken by an examiner. Evi-
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dence thus taken may be sifted and analyzed by competent
subordinates." (Morgan v. United States, supra, 298 U. S.
468,482; Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com.,
supra, p. 501.) [3] The obligation of the panel members
was to achieve a substantial understanding of the record by
any reasonable means, including the use of the referee's summary. (See 2 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, §§ 1].0211.04, pp. 38-57.)
[ 4:] Panel One admittedly considered the entire record,
excepting only the complete transcript of Mrs. Lintz's testimony. The commission now contends that the transcript is
not a part of the record within the meaning of the California
statutes and cases. This view has been suggested by at least
one commentator. (Bancroft, Some Procedural Aspects of the
California Workmen's Compensation La'U', 40 Cal. L. Rev.
378, 392.) There is no apparent reason, however, for distinguishing between the oral and written evidence developed before the referee; both should be considered if relevant to the
issues. On the other hand, there is no reason for requiring
that irrelevant parts of either the written or oral evidence be
reviewed exhaustively. The transcript is as much a part of the
record as is evidence received in written form.
[ 5 ] There is no merit in the commission's contention that
it was not necessary to consider Mrs. Lintz's testimony on the
ground that it was not relevant to the issues on reconsideration. Her testimony related almost exclusively to the extent
of her disabilit~,. The referee's summary of her testimony.
which was before Panel One on reconsideration, made this
clear. The extent of disability was the sole issue presented to
the panel. Thus, Mrs. Lintz's testimony ,vas highly relevant.
[6] Allied takes an equally unrealistic position. It contends that the panel members were obligated to read the entire
record, including the transrript. So rigid a requirement cannot be extracted from the decided cases. It is plain that tll"
members of Panel One" considered and appraised" tIle evidence in the record. The written evidence together with th"
referee's summary of Mrs. Lintz's testimony was ample to
provide a complete and full understanding of the re('or(1. Allied contends that the referee's summary is not adequate. It
is not suggested, however, in what particulars it is defer·tive.
Indeed, the summary emphasizes the parts of Mrs. Lintz's
testimony most favorable to Allied. Allied at no time urg'rd
upon the commission the inadequacy of the summary. Had it
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clone so, pointing to speeifie, material defects in the summary,
the commission would 118ve lJeen ohliged to order a transcript
prepared to 1est the aceurac'y and ('ompletelless of the summary
against it. Despite Allied's failure to point to specific inadefluacies in the summary, we haw compared it with the tra11fwript and have fOllnd 110 material evidenee tending' to support
Allied's ease tllat was ]Jot fairly sllmmarized by the referee.
[7] Allied ('onteud8 that it was denied a fair hearing by
PalJel One's informal use of the rating bureau's opinions.
Such practices have been disapproved. (Young Y. Indnstrial
Acc. Corn., 38 Cal.App.2d 250, 257 [100 P.2d ]062].) The
award after reeonsideration, however, was dearly based upon
the second recommended rating, which "'as formally noticed
and served. A1lied was allowrd to eross-examine the rating
expert and introduce rebuttal evidence with respect to llis
report. There appears to he nothing tlmt Allied could have
accomplished in a hearing on 1111' informal report tlwt it was
])ot permitted to accomplish in the hearing held on the formal
report. Thus, the error was not prejudicial. (See Walsh v.
JlId1lsiria.l Ace. Com., 1 Ca1.2cl 747, 748-749 [36 P.2d ]072].)
[8] Allied also contends that it was denied a fair hearing
hy the refusal of the commiso;ion's referee to allow introduction of further medic!!l evidellce b~nring 011 the extent of :Mrs.
Lintz's disability and other e"ideurc relating to her occupational classification at. the hearing for cross-examination of the
rating expert. That hearing was in terms limited to examination and e"idence bearing 011 the ac('uraey of the rating
expert's eOlldusioll. His recommendation was based upon t]1C
disability statelll<>nt prepar<>d by Pmwl One .. The expert had
no way of knowing w]lethcr or not the factors of disahility
included in that statement w(>r(> accurate. The referee prop<>r]y
disa])owed the proff<.'red <,,,jdNIee.
[9] Alternatively; Alli",d contends that the commission
was bound to grant its motion for further hearing for presentation of this ",,,idem'e. The right to a further h<>aring for introduction of rebuttal e....idence is statutory:
"Transcripts of a)] testjJ11011~' ta1\",n without notiee and
copies of all reports and other matters aodell to the rf'cord,
otherwise than dUl'in~ tlIl' l'onrse of an open hearing, shall be
served upoll the part irs 10 the r.J'o(·('('diug, and an opportnnity
shall be gjyen to prorlul'(' rvi,ll'llCe in explallntion or rebuttal
thereof before decision is rendered." (Lah. Code, § 5704.)
Thc only matters addrd to tIl(' reeord after the initial llear-
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ing were the secret and thc formal rcports of the rating
bureau. Allied was given an adcq\1ate hearing with respect
to these reports.
[10] Beyond this statut ory rig-lit to a further hearing,
the granting of continuances Hlld further hearing's rests in the
sound discretion of the commission. (11' estct·n Pipe «('; Steel
Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 194 Cal. 379, 382 [228 P. 859] ;
see also Geibel v. State Bar, 11 Cal.2d 412, 41G, 417 [79 P.2d
1073] ; Tapley Y. State Bat", 8 Ca1.2d 167, 170-171 [64 P.2d
404].) The commission's rules of practice and procedure provide that a further hearing will not be granted excrpt for good
cause or in the discretion of the commission or its officers.
(Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 8, rule 10774.) [11] Allied argues
that it sbould be permitted to show tbat Mrs. Lintz worked in
the canning rather than ill the produce industry. The former
classification allegcdly would reduce her disability to 64 per
cent and relieve Allied of its present liability for a life
pension. At the initial bearing, however, it was agreed that the
occupational category should be "Celery trimmer-produce,
by hand." [12] Allied also demands a hearing to introduce the report of an indepcndent medical examiner. There is
no claim, however, that there was not a complete and full
opportunity to introduce all relevant medical evidence at the
original hearing. In light of these circumstances, we cannot
hold that the commission abused its discretion in denying
Allied's request for a further hearing.
Allied's contention that there is no substantial evidence in
the record to support the award is without merit. [13] The
<:ommission has the power to resolve conflicts ill the evidence.
(Natiollal Auto. cf: Cas. Ins. Co. Y. Indllst,·ial Ace. Com., supra,
pp. 28-29.) [14] The statement of Mrs. Lintz's disability
formulated by Panel One that provided the basis for the commission's award after reconsideration is supported entirely by
one pll~'sieian 's report that was submitted at the original hearing. Even though this report is in(-onsistent both with the
other medieal opinions in the record and with the referee's
observations of Mrs. Lintz described in his report, it constitutes substantial evidence and may be adopted by the commission. Allied's suggestion that tht' commission misinterpreted the meaning of this report is without merit.
Both the referee and Panel One found that Mrs. Lintz's
entire disability ,,~as caused by the industrial injury, rejecting
Allied's contention that it was caused in part by an earlier
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injury. Allied is also incorrect in asserting that this finding
is not supported by substantial evidence.
The award is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., concurred.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would annul the order, for the
reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Shoemaker in the opinion
prepared by him for the District Court of Appeal, (Cal.App.)
14 Cal.Rptr. 695.
Schauer, J., concurred.

